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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
rrH:E SUPREME COURrT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[42 C.2d 1; 264 P.2d 9211 
[S. F. No. 18871. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1953.] 
HENRY K. HENDERSON, Respondent, v. LILY ZELLER-
BACH DRAKE, Appellant. 
[1] Attachment-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judg-
ment for Defendant: Stay Pending AppeaL-Under Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 553, 946, relating to discharge of attachment after 
judgment for defendant and to effect of appeal, an attachment 
may be preserved by taking an appeal and an attachment re-
mains effective after rendition of judgment for defendant until 
there is no longer a right to appeal, unless written notice of 
entry of judgment is given in which event the appeal must 
be perfected within five days after such notice or attachment 
becomes subject to discharge. 
[2] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for 
Defendant: Stay Pending Appeal.-Code Civ. Proc., § 553, 
declaring that if defendant recovers judgment and no appeal 
is taken and no undertaking filed the "order of attachment 
[must] be discharged," necessarily implies that if an appeal is 
perfected and an undertaking filed the attachment should not 
be discharged. 
[3] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Stay Pending AppeaL--
Code Civ. Proc., § 946, declaring that an appeal does not "con-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 104, 105; 
Am.Jur., Attachment and Garnishment, § 956. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 8, 9] Attachment, §§53, 55; [3] 
Attachment, §55; [5] Attachment, §124; [6] Judgments, §78; 
[7] Waiver,§ 4. 
42 C.2d-1 
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tinue in force an attachment, unless an undertaking·" is filed 
and "unless within five days after written notice of the entry 
of the ol'der appealed from," the appeal is perfected, neces-
sarily implies that filing- of undertaking- and perfeetion of 
appeal will keep attachment alive. 
[ 4] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for 
Defendant: Stay Pending AppeaL--An attachment is not 
finally and irrevocably dissolved the moment a judgment for 
defendant is entered; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946, when con-
strued together, lead to conclusion that dissolvent force of 
judgment is neutralized by a perfected appeal, provided the 
additional undertaking is filed and appeal perfected within 
specified time. 
[5] !d.-Discharge or Dissolution-Proceedings to Dissolve-Order 
on Motion.-A motion to dissolve an attachment was properly 
denied, although more than 60 days had elapsed since entry of 
judgment for defendant without an appeal therefrom having 
been taken by plaintiff, where, at time such motion was denied, 
defendant could have appealed from order granting plaintiff's 
motion for new trial and, had defendant done so, plaintiff 
could have appealed from judg-ment (Rules on Appeal, rule 
3(a)), filed an undertaking, and in that manner kept attach-
ment alive. 
[6] Judgments- Entry- Notice.-A statutory requirement of 
"written notice" of entry of judgment can be waived, and in 
some circumstances the filing, by the party entitled to such 
written notice, of a document disclosing his actual knowledge 
of entry of judgment shows waiver of written notice. 
[7] Waiver-Knowledge and Intent.-Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. 
[8] Attachment-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judg-
ment for Defendant: Stay Pending Appeal.-l\fere fact that 
plaintiff evidenced his actual knowledge of entry of adverse 
judgment by moving for new trial does not show that he in-
tended to waive his right to receive written notice thereof for 
purpose of starting the running of five-day period within which 
he could perfect an appeal and save his attachment. (Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946.) 
[9] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Effect of Judgment for 
Defendant-: Stay Pending AppeaL-Mere fact that defendant 
incidentally indicated to plaintiff, by serving and filing notice 
of motion to dissolve attachment, that judgment for defendant 
had been entered is not sufficient compliance with statutory 
requirement that written notice be given to start running of 
five-day period within which plaintiff could perfect an appeal 
and save his attachment. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 553, 946.) 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco denying motion to dis-
solve an attachment. William T. Sweigert, Judge. Affirmed. 
Erskine, Erskine & Tulley and J. Oscar Goldstein for 
Appellant. 
H. W. Glensor for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant appeals from an order denying 
her motion to dissolve an attachment. The only ground of 
the motion was ''that judgment had been rendered in favor 
of the defendant and no notice of appeal or undertaking 
on appeal had been filed within five days from and after 
the entry of said judgment." The sole question for decision 
is the correctness of the order denying such motion. We have 
concluded that under sections 553 and 946 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, upon which the motion was based, the trial 
court was required to deny it. 
In this action against defendant plaintiff attached certain 
shares of corporate stock owned by defendant. Thereafter, 
on November 26, 1951, judgment for defendant was entered 
in that action. No formal written notice of entry of judgment 
was given to plaintiff. No appeal was taken but on December 
4, 1951, plaintiff served and filed notice of intention to move 
for a new trial. On January 3, 1952, defendant served and 
filed notice of motion to dissolve the attachment. On Jan-
uary 28, 1952, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted. 
On February 6, 1952, defendant's motion to dissolve the 
attachment was denied; on this date neither the time for an 
appeal by defendant from the order granting the new trial 
nor, in the event defendant took such appeal, for a cross-
appeal by plaintiff from the judgment, had expired. 
Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in 
material part, "If the defendant recovers judgment against 
the plaintiff, and no appeal is perfected and undertaking 
executed and filed as provided in section 946 of this code, 
. . . all the property attached . . . must be delivered to the 
defendant or his agent, the order of attachment be discharged, 
and the property released therefrom.'' Section 946 provides 
in material part, ''An appeal does not continue in force an 
attachment, unless an undertaking be executed and filed on 
the part of the appellant . . . and unless, within five days 
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after written notice of the entry of the order appealed from, 
such appeal be perfected.'' 
[1] Under the wording of those sections it is clear that 
an attachment may be preserved by taking an appeal and 
that an attachment remains effective after rendition of judg-
ment for defendant until there is no longer a right to appeal, 
unless written notice of entry of judgment is given, in which 
event the appeal must be perfected within five days after 
such notice or the attachment becomes subject to discharge. 
[2] Section 553 states that if defendant recovers judgment 
and no appeal is taken and no undertaking filed, then the 
"order of attachment [must] be discharged." This neces-
sarily implies that if an appeal is perfected and an undertak-
ing filed, then the attachment should not be discharged. 
[3] Similarly, section 946 states that an appeal does not 
"continue in force an attachment, unless an undertaking" 
is filed and, "unless, within five days after written notice 
of the entry of the order appealed from," the appeal is 
perfected. 'l'his necessarily implies that the filing of the 
undertaking and the perfection of the appeal will keep the 
attachment alive. The only reference to time contained in 
the sections is the requirement of section 946 that the appeal 
be perfected "within five days after written notice of the 
entry of the order appealed from." It is reasonable, there-
fore, to conclude that the attachment remains effective as 
long as an appeal may be taken unless written notice of entry 
of judgment is given, in which event the attachment perdures 
for only five days after such notice unless an appeal is per-
fected within that time. If sections 553 and 946 were not 
so construed, plaintiff would have to file his undertaking and 
perfect his appeal at the same time the judgment for defend-
ant was entered, or the mere entry of judgment for defendant 
would discharge the attachment. 
[4] As is held in Primm v. Superior Court (1906), 3 Cal. 
App. 208, 211 [84 P. 786], an attachment is not "finally and 
irrevocably dissolved the moment a judgment for defendant 
is entered .... A fair, reasonable, unstrained construction 
[of sections 553 and 946] leads to the conclusion that the 
dissolvent force of a judgment is neutralized by a perfected 
appeal, provided the additional undertaking is filed and the 
appeal perfected within the specified time. This construction 
gives harmonious effect to both sections and does not nullify 
any part of either." (See, also, Morneault v. National Surety 
Co. (1918), 37 Cal.App. 285, 286 [174 P. 81]; Clark v. Su-
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perior Court (1918), 37 Cal.App. 732, 734 [174 P. 681]; 
Albertsworth v. Glens Falls Indern. Co. (1948), 84 Cal.App. 
2d 816, 819 [192 P.2d 66]; Davis v. Fidelity &; Deposit Co. 
(1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 13, 16 [208 P.2d 414].) 
[5] The time to appeal had not expired when the notice 
of motion to dissolve the attachment was filed on January 3, 
1952, or when the trial court denied such motion on Feb-
ruary 6, 1952. Plaintiff had 60 days from the entry of 
judgment (i. e., from November 26, 1951) in which to file 
notice of appeal (Rules on Appeal, rule 2(a)), and when 
he served and filed his notice of intention to move for a new 
trial the time for appeal was extended (Rules on Appeal, 
rule 3 (a) ) . When the trial court denied the motion to dis-
solve the attachment, plaintiff's motion for a new trial had 
been granted. Regardless of the effect or lack of effect on 
the attachment of the order granting a new trial, defendant 
at the time of the denial of her motion to dissolve the attach-
ment could have appealed from the order granting the new 
trial and, had she clone so, plaintiff could have appealed from 
the judgment (Rules on Appeal, rule 3 (a)). Therefore, on 
February 6, 1952, there was still an opportunity for plaintiff 
to perfect an appeal, file an undertaking, and in that manner 
keep alive the attachment, and the trial court correctly 
refused to order that the attachment be dissolved. 
Since no written notice of entry of the judgment of Novem-
ber 26, 1951, was given, the five days referred to in section 
946 did not run. Defendant urges that although she did not 
give formal notice of entry of judgment and thus start the 
running of the five-day period, there was substantial com-
pliance with the requirement of section 946 that ''written 
notice'' be given. She says that her notice of motion to 
dissolve the attachment was, in effect, a notice of entry of 
judgment, and that plaintiff's notice of motion for a new 
trial constituted a waiver of written notice of entry of judg-
ment. [6] It is true that a statutory requirement of "writ-
ten notice" of entry of judgment can be waived, and that in 
some circumstances it has been held that the filing, by the 
party entitled to such written notice, of a document disclos-
ing his actual knowledge of the entry of judgment shows 
waiver of the written notice. (Prothero v. Superior Cottrt 
(1925), 196 Cal. 439, 441, 444 [238 P. 357].) [7] But 
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
(Roesch v. De Mota (1944), 24 Cal.2cl 563, 572 [150 P.2d 
422] .) [8] The fact that plaintiff here evidenced his actual 
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knowledge of the entry of judgment does not show that he 
intended to waive his right to receive written notice thereof 
for the purpose of starting the running of the five-day period 
within which he could save his attachment. (See Hughes 
Mfg. etc. Co. v. Elliott (1914), 167 Cal. 494, 496 [140 P. 17] .) 
[9] And the fact that defendant incidentally indicated to 
plaintiff, by serving and filing her notice of motion to dissolve 
the attachment, that judgment had been entered is not suffi-
cient compliance with the statutory requirement that written 
notice be given to start the running of the five-day period. 
(See Byrne v. Hudson (1899), 127 Cal. 254,257 [59 P. 597].) 
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
By a skillful process of legal legerdemain the majority 
opinion attempts to bring to life an attachment which died 
a natural death on January 28, 1952, when plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial was granted by the trial court. 
It is conceded by the majority that pursuant to sections 
553 and 946 of the Code of Civil Procedure an attachment 
is dissolved when judgment is rendered in favor of the de-
fendant unless he perfects an appeal and gives an under-
taking within five days after receiving notice of entry of 
judgment, and that it is not kept alive by proceedings on 
motion for a new trial. 
In the light of this concession let us examine the record: 
(1) November 26, 1951. Judgment for defendant entered. 
(2) December 4, 1951. Plaintiff served and filed notice of 
intention to move for a new trial on all statutory grounds. 
(3) January 3, 1952. Defendant served and filed notice to 
dissolve attachment. 
( 4) January 28, 1952. Motion for new trial granted. 
( 5) February 6, 1952. Motion to dissolve attachment 
denied. 
(6) The agreed statement on appeal states: "No appeal 
has ever been taken by [defendant] Henry K. Henderson 
from said judgment. No undertaking on appeal was filed by 
Henry K. Henderson within five days after the entry of said 
judgment or at any other time.'' 
It is true that no formal notice of entry of judgment was 
Dec.1953] HENDERSON v. DRAKE 
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given by defendant, but both plaintiff's notice of intention 
to move for a new trial and defendant's notice of motion 
to dissolve the attachment refer to "the judgment heretofore 
made and entered in the above entitled action." It seems 
to me that it is stretching legalism to the breaking point to 
say, in view of this record, that plaintiff did not have adequate 
notice of entry of judgment. But conceding that he did not, 
and that his time to perfect an appeal from the judgment 
and give an undertaking did not expire until five days after 
such notice was given, or his time for appeal had expired, 
or had lost his right to appeal, there can be no question that 
the latter event occurred on January 28th, 1952, when his 
motion for a new trial was granted. This event terminated 
his right to appeal, as it is well settled that an appeal does 
not lie from an unconditional order or judgment in favor 
of the appellant and such an appeal must be dismissed (3 Cal. 
Jur.2d § 110, p. 566). The fact that plaintiff could have 
cross-appealed from the judgment if defendant had appealed 
from the order granting the new trial, is beside the question, 
as defendant did not appeal and the order granting plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial has become final. There can be no 
question that plaintiff's right to appeal from the judgment 
was lost when his motion for a new trial was granted. Con-
ceding that plaintiff would have had a right to cross-appeal 
from the judgment if defendant had appealed from the order 
granting the new trial, since defendant did not appeal from 
said order, plaintiff's right to cross-appeal never came into 
existence. 
rrhe order denying defendant's motion to dissolve the at-
tachment was entered February 6, 1952, nine days after the 
motion for a new trial was granted. At that time plaintiff 
had not and could not comply with the requirements of sec-
tions 553 and 946 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the 
motion to dissolve the attachment should, therefore, have been 
granted. 
Even accepting the unsound reasoning of the majority, that 
at the time defendant's motion to dissolve the attachment 
was denied, plaintiff's time to appeal had not expired, because 
he had the right to cross-appeal if defendant appealed from 
the order granting the new trial, and, therefore, the motion 
was properly denied, it will avail plaintiff nothing, as the 
attachment must now be dissolved because of plaintiff's non-
compliance with the provisions of sections 553 and 946 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
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The last cited code sections and decisions construing them 
make it clear that the pendency of a motion for a new trial 
or the granting of that motion does not operate to stay the 
extinguishment of an attachment, or that an attachment con-
tinues in force until the motion is determined. While the 
Legislature saw fit to provide for keeping the attachment 
alive in event of an appeal by plaintiff, and there appears 
to be no reason why they· did not make a similar provision 
in case of a pending motion for a new trial, the fact remains 
that section 553, supra, requires without limitation (except 
in the case of appeal) that when defendant recovers judgment 
the attachment must be discharged. Nothing is said about a 
motion for new trial and I know of no other statute which 
makes the pendency of such a motion operate to keep the 
attachment alive. There is no provision for giving an under-
taking to keep the attachment in force when a motion for a 
new trial is made as there is when an appeal is taken. The 
undertaking in the case of an appeal is to give protection 
to the defendant in addition to that afforded by the under-
taking to obtain the attachment. (Albertsworth v. Glens Falls 
Inclern. Co., 84 Cal.App.2d 816 [192 P.2d 66].) The absence 
of a provision for such added protection pending the dispo-
sition of a motion for a new trial indicates that the pendency 
of such a motion does not keep the attachment alive. It has 
been held that a motion for a new trial does not in itself 
stay the execution of the judgment by the prevailing party. 
(People v. Loucks, 28 Cal. 68; Jones v. Spears, 56 Cal. 163; 
Harris v. Barnhart, 97 Cal. 546 [32 P. 589]; Kolcole v. Su-
perior Court, 17 Cal.App. 454 [120 P. 67]; Knowles v. 
Thompson, 133 Cal. 245, 247 [65 P. 468] ; 121 A.L.R. 686.) 
Before it was amended in 1907 and 1909 (Stats. 1907, p. 708; 
1909, p. 967), section 553 did not contain the provision for 
keeping the attachment alive by perfecting an appeal, and it 
was held that an appeal by plaintiff from the judgment and 
a reversal thereof did not stay the discharge of the attach-
ment or revive it. (Loveland v. Alvord Consol. Quartz Min. 
Co., 76 Cal. 562 [18 P. 682] ; Hamilton v. Bell, 123 Cal. 93 
[55 P. 758]; contra: cases collected 115 A.L.R. 598.) And 
under the prior law the lack of finality of the judgment 
with regard to appeal did not prevent the discharge of the 
attachment. (Aigeltinger v. Whelan, 133 Cal. 110 [65 P. 
125] .) Indeed, since the amendment to 553, the making in 
the trial court and granting of a motion to vacate a judgment 
for defendant does not preserve the attachment (Clark v. 
Dec.1953] HENDERSON V. DRAKE 
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Superior Court, 37 Cal.App. 732 [174 P. 681}). Under a 
statute similar to ours the same result has been reached in 
regard to a pending motion for a new trial (Ranft v. Young, 
21 Nev. 401 [32 P. 490] ). It is clear, therefore, that the 
Legislature has not made either the pendency or granting 
of a motion for a new trial after judgment for defendant 
effective to keep alive or revive an attachment. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority affirms an 
order which is obviously invalid and which must be vacated 
by the trial court when this decision becomes final. This, 
however, will necessitate further proceedings in the trial 
court and another appeal if the losing party sees fit to thus 
prolong the litigation. 
This is unfortunate in view of the overcrowded condition 
of our court calendars. It also violates the policy of our 
courts to decide cases so as to terminate litigation wherever 
possible in the interests of justice. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
It is my opinion that plaintiff had written notice of the 
entry of judgment within the meaning of section 946 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure and that his right to preserve the 
attachment by taking an appeal was therefore lost five days 
after the service of the notice. 
Judgment :for defendant was entered on November 26, 1951. 
On December 4, 1951, plaintiff served and filed notice of 
intention to move for a new trial, and on January 3, 1952, 
defendant served and filed notice of motion to vacate the 
attachment on the ground that ''judgment had been rendered 
in favor of the defendant and no notice of appeal or under-
taking on appeal had been filed within five days from and 
after the entry of said judgment.'' At no time thereafter 
did plaintiff perfect an appeal from the judgment. Defend-
ant's motion was denied on February 6, 1952, after plaintiff's 
motion :for a new trial had been granted. Section 946 of the 
Code o:f Civil Procedure provides that an attachment may 
be continued in force if an appeal is perfected "within five 
days after written notice o:f the entry of the' order appealed 
from." "\Vhether or not plaintiff's notice of motion for a 
new trial constituted a waiver of the right to written notice 
(see Prothero v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 439, 444 [238 P. 
357], defendant's notice of motion to vacate the attachment, 
which recited that ''judgment had been rendered in favor 
10 HENDERSON v. DRAKE [42 U.2d 
of defendant,'' constituted written notice of the entry of the 
judgment within the meaning of seetion 946. The right to 
preserve the attachment by taking an appeal was therefore 
lost five days after the service of the notice on January 3, 1952. 
Section 946 assures the plaintiff knowledge of the entry 
of judgment and fixes the date for the eommeneement of 
the running of the five-day period. These purposes were 
aceomplished when defendant served and filed her notice of 
motion to vacate the attachment. The only other possible 
purpose for the notiee of the entry of judgment is to bring 
home to the plaintiff that the defendant is asserting his right 
to have the attaehment dissolved if an appeal is not perfected 
in five days. (See Byrne v. Htldson, 127 Cal. 254, 257 [59 
P. 597] .) Since defendant's notice expressly called plain-
tiff's attention to the fact that defendant was relying on 
the entry of judgment to establish her right to dissolution of 
the attaehment, it could not have subserved this purpose better. 
The majority opinion states, however, that "the fact that 
defendant incidentally indieated to plaintiff, by serving and 
filing her notice of motion to dissolve the attachment, that 
judgment had been entered is not sufficient eompliance with 
the statutory requirement that written notiee be given to 
start the nmning of the five-day period. (See Byrne v. 
Hudson (1899), 127 Cal. 254,257 [59 P. 597].)" In the 
Byrne case the judgment provided that if plaintiff did not 
pay defendant a certain sum of money within 20 days of 
written notice of entry of judgment she would lose her equity 
of redemption. Defendant served on plaintiff a notice of 
intention to move for a new trial, reciting that the judgment 
had been entered. 'l'he court held that this notice of motion 
was not sufiicient to start the running of the 20-day period. 
'' 'rhe question arose out of the express terms of the judgment, 
which required 'written notice of the entry of this judgment.' 
We think, therefore, that as appellant's rig·ht in the premises 
depended upon the commencement of the running of a cer-
tain period of time mentioned in the judgment, and as her 
title was to be forfeited unless a certain act was done within 
that period of time, she was entitled to a notice expressly 
intended for the purpose of starting the period of time 
mentioned in the judgment, and that a mere incidental recital 
in a notice of a motion for a new trial, given for an entirely 
different purpose, was not a sufficient compliance with the 
terms of the judgment." (127 Cal. at 257.) In the present 
case, however, defendant's notice of motion was not given 
Jan. 1954] BEYERBACH v. JuNo OrL Co. 
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for a purpose foreign to the attachment, but was related 
directly to the effect of the entry of judgment on its continu-
ance. The fact that judgment had been entered was not 
recited merely incidentally, but as the very basis for the 
intended motion. Defendant may have been premature in 
noticing her motion to dissolve the attachment, but by doing 
so she gave plaintiff all the notice of the entry of judgment 
to which he was entitled. When he failed within five days to 
perfect an appeal from the judgment, defendant was entitled 
to have the attachment dissolved. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
27, 1954. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22341. In Bank. Jan. 5, 1954.] 
CHARLES BEYJ1JRBACH, Appellant, v. JUNO OIL COM-
pANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Security for Costs and Attorneys' Fees.-While Corp. Code, 
§ 834, requiring stockholder in derivative action to furnish 
security for defendants' expenses if trial court finds that 
there is no reasonable probability that corporation will benefit 
from action, does not contain a comparable provision requiring 
corporation to post security for stockholder's expenses if trial 
court finds a probability that corporation will benefit, this is 
not a denial of equal protection, since stockholder will not 
incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to bring in 
equity a suit in corporation's right and, if he does bring suit, 
he knows that he, like all others in his class, will be subject 
to regulating provisions of statute. 
(2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation-Judg-
ment-Costs and Counsel Fees.-Although the law does not 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, §§ 225, 226; Am.Jur., Cor-
porations, § 471. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5, 6, 9-14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23] Cor-
porations, § 368.5; [2] Corporations, § 368; [4, 8] Corporations, 
§ 353; [7] Constitutional Law, § 150; [15] Bonds, § 2; [18, 19] 
Corporations, § 363; [21] Motions, § 24(6), 
